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Abstract 
The ability to reason under uncertainty and with 
incomplete information is a fundamental require­
ment of decision support technology. In this paper 
we argue that the concentration on theoretical 
techniques for the evaluation and selection of de­
cision options has distracted attention from many 
of the wider issues in decision making. Although 
numerical methods of reasoning under uncertain­
ty have strong theoretical foundations, they are 
representationally weak and only deal with a 
small part of the decision process. Knowledge­
based systems, on the other hand, offer greater 
flexibility but have not been accompanied by a 
clear decision theory. We describe here work 
which is under way towards providing a theoreti­
cal framework for symbolic decision procedures. 
A central proposal is an extended form of infer­
ence which we call argumentation; reasoning for 
and against decision options from generalised do­
main theories. The approach has been successful­
ly used in several decision support applications, 
but it is argued that a comprehensive decision the­
ory must cover autonomous decision making, 
where the agent can formulate questions as well as 
take decisions. A major theoretical challenge for 
this theory is to capture the idea of reflection to 
permit decision agents to reason about their goals, 
what they believe and why, and what they need to 
know or do in order to achieve their goals. 
1 INTRODUCTION1 
Medicine has been an important field for developing and 
testing decision support systems which are capable of rea­
soning with uncertain and incomplete information. Ex peri-
ments with numerical techniques for diagnosis and other 
applications began in the sixties, and produced some early 
encouraging progress, notably de Dombal's classic work 
on the diagnosis of abdominal pain [ 1]. By the end of the 
seventies, systems such as MYCIN, INTERNIST and 
CASNET were showing that symbolic techniques for 
knowledge representation, inference and heuristic reason­
ing held much promise for decision support systems. While 
arousing great excitement, these early expert systems were 
also treated with some skepticism by decision theorists on 
the grounds that they were somewhat ad hoc in design. This 
stimulated a great deal of technical activity in developing 
more rigorous and precise numerical uncertainty handling 
techniques, but we feel that this has distracted attention 
from many fundamental issues which still need to be ad­
dressed in order to produce flexible and sound decision 
support systems that will have significant impact in many 
practical applications. 
A major cause of the criticisms levelled at some of the 
above mentioned systems, was the attempt to incorporate 
uncertainty handling into a simple rule-based knowledge 
representation framework. There is, unfortunately, a funda­
mental conflict between the demands of computational 
tractability and of semantic expressiveness. The modulari­
ty of simple rule-based systems aids efficient data update 
procedures. However, severe evidence independence as­
sumptions have to be made for uncertainties to be com­
bined and propagated using strictly local calculations. A 
general and rigorous implementation of a fully intentional 
system, in which all possible interactions between rules 
and evidences are taken into account on each data update, 
could become so computationally intractable that the de­
velopment of a realistic application would be infeasible 
1. This paper is a shortened and revised version of a keynote 
address given at the IMACS workshop in Qualitative Reason­
ing and Decision Support Systems, Toulouse, March 13-15, 
1991 [8]. 
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(12]. In order to develop computationally tractable, yet rig­
orous, uncertainty handling mechanisms much recent work 
has been directed towards the development of graphical 
structures in which the dependencies and influences be­
tween knowledge items are explicitly represented [11], 
[13]. This has led to a realisation that the correct structuring 
of the knowledge that is relevant in a given decision mak­
ing context is as important, if not rrwre important, than the 
numerical values that are propagated through the graph. 
In fact, at least for certain classes of applications such as 
medical diagnostic applications, decision accuracy can be 
highly insensitive to these values. In [2] for example the 
performance of a strictly probabilistic approach to diagno­
sis and a heuristic approach were quantitatively compared. 
Using a database of medical records of some 400 patients 
who had been reliably diagnosed as having one of 5 differ­
ent gastrointestinal conditions, two diagnostic systems 
were constructed. The first was a simple bayesian proce­
dure for computing posterior probabilities given a set of pa­
tient symptoms. The second was a set of categorical 
production rules for interpreting patterns of symptoms. The 
rules excluded quantitative information about the associa­
tions between symptoms and diseases. A typical rule was: 
if: age( elderly) and weight_loss(present) 
then: maybe(cancer) 
It turned out that the diagnostic accuracy of the rule-based 
system approximately equalled that of the probabilistic 
system (-70%)1 while requesting only half the available 
symptom data. The relative naturalness of the categorical 
representation did not apparently entail a significant reduc­
tion in decision making performance. 
There are well documented differences between the per­
formance of different numerical calculi [17], [18]. Howev­
er, theoreticians have not paid so much attention to studies 
comparing precise with imprecise methods like the above. 
There is considerable evidence that the performance of a 
well structured, largely symbolic system may well be as 
good as a more rigorous numerical approach [20]. In [28], 
it was demonstrated that a purely symbolic system only dif­
fered in behaviour from a numerical probabilistic system in 
those cases with an uncommon diagnosis (prior probability 
::; 0.03). Chard's conclusion was that, so long as it could be 
ensured that a purely symbolic approach could pick up the 
less common conditions, then it would suffer no perform­
ance disadvantage when compared to a bayesian system. 
We will go further than simply saying there is no disadvan­
tage; we shall argue that a symbolic approach to decision 
making has in fact many advantages (other than reducing 
the purely computational and cost overheads associated 
with the elicitation and use of large amounts of numerical 
data). The next section will suggest that a symbolic ap­
proach allows us to explicate more of the decision process, 
1. This figure is not untypical; in gastroenterology a diagnostic 
accuracy from the patient history alone is frequently much 
lower than this because of high intrinsic uncertainty. 
including the knowledge required to define, organise and 
make a decision. It also allows us to explicitly represent de­
cisions, knowledge sources, reasoning strategies and repre­
sentations, and to reason about the control and inference 
processes involved in specific tasks. These are all require­
ments which need to be satisfied if we are to be able to de­
velop systems with an advanced decision making 
capability. The third section of this paper addresses the re­
quirements of a particularly challenging class of AI system, 
those capable of making decisions autonomously. 
2 SYMBOLIC DECISION MAKING 
UNDER UNCERTAINTY 
The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines a decision as fol­
lows "Decision: settlement of (question etc.), conclusion, 
formal judgement, making up one's mind". But how should 
we settle questions, particularly where they involve uncer­
tainty? The view from classical decision theory is quite un­
equivocal: 
"First, the uncertainties present in the situation must be 
quantified in terms of values called probabilities. Second, 
the various consequences of the courses of action must be 
similarly described in terms of utilities. Third that decision 
must be taken which is expected- on the basis of the calcu­
lated probabilities- to give the greatest utility." 
Dennis Lindley [3]. 
Probabilistic inference, or "how degrees of belief are al­
tered by data"(4] is one of the two pillars of classical deci­
sion theory. Unfortunately it is widely acknowledged that 
objective probabilities (e.g. frequency based estimates of 
the cooccurrence of symptoms and diseases) are impracti­
cal for general decision making. Therefore the Bayesian 
notion of "subjective probability", of a person's willing­
ness to accept a wager, has been formulated in a well-de­
fined way in order to finesse this difficulty. 
In reality the (psychological) processes that are involved in 
the formulation of subjective probabilities, and the formal 
nature of such numbers, are obscure. Probabilistic infer­
ence certainly places clear mathematical requirements on 
"coherent" belief revision procedures but it pays little at­
tention to the question of what numerical degrees of belief 
can be said to represent. Unfortunately, heuristic methods 
may suffer from the reverse problem; while symbolic rep­
resentational techniques are claimed to capture knowledge 
of informal domains like medicine quite well, the formal 
requirements of sound reasoning are not always adequately 
addressed. 
The second pillar of decision theory is utility: roughly a nu­
merical representation of the costs and benefits associated 
with deciding on a particular option. Unfortunately, as with 
probability, though for different reasons, it is often difficult 
to assign objective measures of utility to the consequences 
of decisions (e.g. the utility of life and death; pain or dis­
tress). Even in situations where there seems to be an objec­
tive scale (e.g. monetary value) the relationship between 
subjective and objective scales is not at all clear. 
It should also be noted that subjective values are multidi­
mensional not unidimensional, and often qualitative. For 
example a drug treatment may be desirable because it is 
painless, because it can be taken at home, and because it is 
low cost, while it may be less desirable than a surgical pro­
�edure because �e latter has a higher success rate, though 
It may compromise long term quality of life. Quantitative 
repr�sentation of values remains, at the very least, contro­
versial. 
In this section we will describe techniques for a number of 
aspects of decision making which are non-quantitative and 
yet can be clearly formulated. These techniques make use 
of first-order logic (POL) to formulate methods for reason­
i?g for and a�ainst decision options; introducing new op­
tions; structunng the decision; representing beliefs, values 
and preferences; taking the decision, and improving com­
munication between decision support systems and their us­
ers. 
2.1 EXTENDING THE REQUIREMENTS FOR 
SYMBOLIC REASONING 
Inf�r�nce is t�e p!vot of most kinds of problem solving and 
deciSion makmg IS no exception. Classical decision theory 
eJ?lphasises probabilistic inference, and many other tech­
mques (both numerical and logical) are being developed to 
capture aspects of commonsense inference which are not 
expressible in standard monotonic logic [22]. However, 
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these formalisations apply to just one (albeit a central one) 
of the activities �ssociated with decision support. They ad­
dress the evaluation and selection of decision options. Sur­
rounding this activity are a number of further layers of 
activities, represented in figure 1 (after Andriole [5]), in­
volving information acquisition, the actual identification of 
relevant decision options, and so forth. The concentration 
on the development of formalisms for option evaluation 
and selection h� distracted attention from providing a 
more formal basis for these other activities [6). 
To address the requirements raised by a more eclectic view 
of �ecisio
.
n support we shall have to extend radically our 
?otion of mference to one which can work at the multiplic­
Ity of levels represented in figure 1. We need to construct a 
general inference mechanism which satisfies at least the 
following requirements: 
1. I� must ?e able to construct arguments for decision op­
tions usmg whatever knowledge is productive; we do 
not wish to restrict reasoning to, nor for it to wholly de­
pend upon, any one kind of inference (such as statisti­
cal inference) if this is restrictive. 
2. There must be an explicit conceptualisation of what it 
means to make a decision and the roles of different 
kinds of inference in that process [7]. 
3. I� is desirable .� have a simple declarative representa­tion of the deciSion procedure, decision criteria and ap­
plication knowledge, permitting greater flexibility and 
Problem definition 
and structuring 
Data collection 
Option generation 
Option evaluation and selection 
Plans, decisions, structures 
Priori tisation 
Explanation, forecasting 
description 
Figure 1: Decision making activities (after Andriole [5]). 
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more natural understanding by designers and users. 
4. Of course we also want our extended inference to be 
well understood and mathematically sound. 
The demand for greater capabilities in decision support 
systems, and the need to address these requirements is en­
capsulated in a central goal of our research: achieving a 
deep understanding of what we have dubbed symbolic de­
cision procedures (SDPs). Informally a symbolic decision 
procedure can be characterised as: 
an explicit representation of the knowledge required to de­
fine, organise and make a decision, and ... a logical ab­
straction from the qualitative and quantitative knowledge 
that is required for any specific application. A SDP may in­
clude a specification of when and how the procedure is to 
be executed [6]. 
The basic idea of classical decision making is the weighing 
of quantitative evidence and values for predefined options; 
the fundamental mechanism of a symbolic decision proce­
dure is a flexible framework for qualitative reasoning that 
we call argumentation. Argumentation provides a rigorous 
basis for weighing the pros and cons of decisions but also 
for structuring the decision and, as we shall see later, for 
controlling the initiation and execution of a decision proc­
ess. 
2.2 INFERENCE AND "ARGUMENTATION" 
Our central thesis is that practical decision making requires 
diverse sources of domain specific and domain independ­
ent knowledge. The relevance and nature of various forms 
of knowledge may vary with the context and the decision. 
To accommodate this, we use an extended form of infer­
ence, which we call argumentation. Informally we want to 
capture some of the kinds of argument that are commonly 
used in decision making, such as "based on the facts that 
the patient is elderly and suffering from weight loss, there 
is support for the proposition that cancer is present" 
Argumentation consists of the identification and appraisal 
of lines of reasoning about propositions. Argumentation 
permits the use of whatever theories and sources of knowl­
edge are deemed appropriate. An argument for a proposi­
tion P may have an associated qualifier or sign SP which 
represents the certainty of the proposition given that the ar­
gument is valid. The grounds for the argument, Gp• are also 
associated with the proposition. These indicate the facts 
used in initiating the argument, and the theories used to 
connect these facts with P. 
More formally, if an argument is identified for a proposi­
tion P, then we may write 
KB f- (P,Sp,Gp) 
with SP and GP as above. The qualifier S.P and grounds GP are not merely present to provide useful mformation to the 
user. They also satisfy a more formal requirement. Multiple 
triples will be associated with a proposition P if P can be 
deduced with different qualifiers SP, or with the same qual-
ifiers but using different grounds GP. We say these consti­
tute distinct arguments for P. 
The knowledge base, KB, over which the inference engine 
operates may be partitioned into a number of theories. 
These may be domain specific theories, consisting primari­
ly of ground facts, or domain independent theories consist­
ing of first order rules for establishing links between 
knowledge items in a given task. A further knowledge layer 
may contain information about which theories are relevant 
to which specific tasks. In our view practical decision mak­
ing may involve arguing from different points of view (e.g. 
arguing from a causal theory, an anatomical theory, a theo­
ry of physiological function or from statistical knowledge). 
The kinds of theory that are relevant are determined by the 
kind of decision that is being taken. We have to keep these 
theories partitioned because in practice we cannot guaran­
tee that the different views that they embody are globally 
consistent. 
A more detailed discussion on how arguments can be con­
structed may be found in [9] and [26]. 
2.3 AGGREGATION OF ARGUMENTS 
We have seen that from different grounds it is possible to 
construct multiple arguments about (for or against) a prop­
osition. If: 
KB f- (P,SJ,GJ) 
KB f- (P,S2,Gz) 
where S1 i' S2, or G1 i' G2, then there are two distinct argu­
ments for P. Once two or more distinct arguments have 
been identified for a proposition P, the associated qualifiers 
S; will need to be aggregated to form a global qualification 
ofP. 
The process of argumentation allows plenty of scope for 
the definition of various aggregation operators, both nu­
merical and qualitative. The Si may be taken from a variety 
of symbolic or numeric dictionaries. Here we shall focus on 
a simple 4-valued dictionary: 
(confirmed, eliminated, supported, opposed}. 
exactly one of which must be associated with each argu­
ment. The semantics of these terms is not numerical, but 
where probabilities (or other numerical certainty data) are 
available they could be substituted without modification to 
the basic argumentation framework. 
Our interest of course is in the more common situation 
where those data are not available. A straightforward ag­
gregation operator is simply to add up the arguments for 
and against each option, and decide on that with the largest 
ratio of pros to cons. This was the method employed in the 
gastroenterology example described in the introduction, 
and such improper linear decision rules are well recognised 
as effective. 
We can also formulate symbolic aggregation operators. 
Making the grounds explicit in the argument has obvious 
value in the user interface, but they can also play an im-
portant part in aggregation because we can use them in 
computing states of belief in options (or any proposition). 
This can be done using logical schemata which demand no 
numerical coefficients, but which we believe are intuitively 
appealing and logically coherent. 
The following symbolic aggregation rules1 define logical 
schemata for assigning propositions to various classes of 
belief: conceivable; possible; plausible; confirmed. 
(P, conceivable) 
�not 3G • (P, G, eliminated). 
(P, possible) 
� (P, conceivable) A 3G • (P,G, supported). 
(P, plausible) 
� (P, possible) A not 3G • (P, G, opposed). 
(P, confrrmed) 
� (P, conceivable) A 3G • (P, G, confrrmed). 
The aggregation operator defined by this schema allows 
only a fairly coarse-grained categorisation of decision op­
tions. A more complex schema could be defined to allow 
finer distinctions, but in The Oxford System of Medicine 
(OSM), a decision support system designed to provide 
flexible assistance for general medical practice (and a spe­
cialised derivative for oncology, BOSS) [16], the 4 qualifi­
ers in the dictionary above, together with the belief terms 
constructible from them, provide an adequate basis for car­
rying out decision making. 
Our contention is that for many problems, where limited 
statistical data are available, attempts to use numbers to 
make a fine grained distinction between decision options 
may be unnecessary, and lead to illusory precision in the fi­
nal result. A logical approach to arguing for and against and 
comparing decision options, on the other hand, has a clear­
ly defined semantics which is easily explained to and un­
derstood by the user. 
2.4 DISCUSSION 
Current probabilistic techniques require the prior construc­
tion of the �aph linking decision options to observables 
and findings . However, the exact nature of these links may 
vary with context and the nature of the decision problem at 
hand, and in general decision systems should be able to 
construct and revise the graph dynamically as information 
becomes available and the goals of the problem at hand are 
identified [15]. Our approach allows for arguing about this 
graph structure [14],[15]; for example, the discovery that a 
patient is under medication which can cause an observed 
abnormality as a side effect may lead to a revision of the 
graph that had previously been generated. 
We have described a purely symbolic approach to identify-
!. Called "annotation rules" in [6], [14], [15]. 
2. Although we are grateful to an anonymous referee for draw­
ing our attention to work that is underway to correct this defi­
ciency. 
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ing and evaluating decision options. Further to this, we aim 
to develop techniques which address how and when a deci­
sion may be taken. As with symbolic terms for representing 
states of belief, symbolic representations of preference and 
value may not be arbitrary but must be assigned an explicit 
semantics. In order to avoid confounding distinct logical 
ideas like obligations, duties and preferences we are taking 
an approach in which arguments are constructed from prin­
ciples of what must be done ("deontic" principles) and what 
ought to be done ("praxeological" principles) and pluralis­
tic value theory [10]. 
It is our intention to strive towards a normative theory of 
decision making. To achieve this we need "an explicit con­
ceptualisation of what it means to make a decision" (re­
quirement 2 above). A possible approach to this is 
discussed in the next section. 
3 AUTONOMOUS DECISION MAKING 
UNDER UNCERTAINTY 
The central claim of section 2 was that symbolic proce­
dures can significantly extend the capabilities for reasoning 
about belief and values and structuring the decision as com­
pared with strictly numerical procedures (requirement 1 
above). A further advantage we claim is that a symbolic ap­
proach allows for an explicit representation of the decision 
itself. Neither classical decision theory nor work on knowl­
edge based decision aids have placed emphasis on this, ap­
parently because these systems are intended to assist in 
decision making, not to make decisions autonomously. 
They can rely on knowledgeable users to critically super­
vise the decision process. In our view this is a serious omis­
sion from, and challenge to, theory. For practical reasons 
and to be confident in our understanding of the limits on de­
cision making capabilities we need to address the problem 
of building systems that can operate autonomously, with­
out relying on external support. 
There is a steadily increasing interest in AI in the develop­
ment of autonomous agents [23]. In particular SOAR, an 
"architecture for general intelligence" [21] and HOMER, a 
simulated submersible capable of receiving task instruc­
tions and autonomously planning its solution [24], are 
projects which are making interesting progress towards au­
tonomous capabilities. Although not developed with either 
decision theory or uncertainty management in mind they 
may guide us towards a statement of what the capabilities 
of an autonomous decision system should be. We first at­
tempt the following definition of an autonomous agent: 
An agent is autonomous with respect to its environment if 
it can set and achieve goals, and respond adaptively to 
events in its environment, without external advice or assist­
ance. 
Practical environments are frequently so complex they can 
evolve in far more ways than could be allowed for in any a 
priori structuring of a decision. A definite requirement for 
an autonomous decision maker therefore is that it should be 
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responsive to the arrival of unexpected information. For ex­
ample, HOMER [24] is given an instruction to collect a 
package from a pier and constructs a plan to do this. En 
route, however, it finds a large ship on its course; HOMER 
must perceive this, recognise its implications and replan to 
achieve its goal. 
In general information may at any time become available to 
a decision maker that has implications for any aspect of a 
decision viz: raising new problems requiring additional de­
cisions; challenging the grounds for current beliefs, or in­
dicating that the current decision can be taken without 
further information. 
Part of the responsiveness of an effective decision maker is 
the ability to recognise that there is a decision to be taken. 
The Concise Oxford Dictionary relates a decision to the 
"settlement of a question". Classical decision theory has 
had much to say about how we should settle a question; the 
new challenge is to understand how these questions are 
formulated in the first place. This suggests a revision to our 
definition: 
An agent is an autonomous decision maker if it can pose 
and resolve questions about the state of its envir011ment or 
the actions that are desirable to achieve its goals 
If a decision maker could ask and answer questions such as 
the following it would gain great power: 
1. The pivotal questions are: what is the problem? what 
do I need to know, or do? As with all AI systems we 
will necessarily require an explicit representation of 
the systems goals in order to be able to formulate these 
questions. Decision theory has taken the question of 
what a decision is required for entirely for granted. As 
soon as we address it a cascade of further questions 
follows. 
2. What do I know that is relevant to this decision? An 
agent that has a great deal of knowledge may encoun­
ter difficulties in retrieving relevant knowledge during 
decision making. Explicit representation of theories 
and their applicability aids search. 
3. What are the possible options? How could I find out? 
Symbolic decision procedures can introduce decision 
options as information is acquired by making use of 
explicit advice like "in diagnosis, propose possible 
causes of symptoms as possible diagnoses". 
4. What justifies a belief (value or preference)? Is this ar­
gument still valid? Practical problem solving almost 
always risks blind-alleys and misunderstandings. The 
underpinning of beliefs by explicit arguments that 
record the grounds for those beliefs provides the infor­
mation necessary for detecting and resolving incon­
sistencies [25]. 
5. Am I thinking about this decision the right way? All 
problem solving takes place in a "problem space" 
which embodies presuppositions about the problem 
and affects the way problem solving proceeds. If pre­
suppositions or representations are implicit then we 
are at the mercy of them. If theories and presupposi­
tions are explicit then the agent potentially has the 
ability to detect when assumptions of validity or rele­
vance are violated. 
3.1 REQUIREMENTS AND SKETCH OF AN 
AUTONOMOUS DECISION MAKER 
In this section we summarise some of the principle require­
ments for a comprehensive decision capability and the 
main theoretical challenges that they entail. The principle 
requirements for an autonomous decision maker include 
the following: 
1. It should be able to observe and interpret its environ­
ment, and recognise when a decision or sequence of 
decisions needs to be taken in order to achieve its 
goals. 
2. Goals and decisions should be represented explicitly. 
One approach (used in the OSM and BOSS) is to rep­
resent the "generic" decision as the root class in a gen­
eralisation hierarchy. This defines the decision 
procedure as a set of partially instantiated attribute 
templates, such as: 
decision_prototype(Decision,Prototype). 
relevant_ theories(Decision, Theories). 
relevant_argument_types(Decision,Arguments). 
option_proposal_criteria(Decision,Criteria). ... 
3. The decision maker should be able to classify the types 
of decision required. One way to do this is to associate 
with each class a particular decision_prototype, invok­
ing it when its prototype is satisfied. For example a 
prototype for a diagnosis decision may specify that if 
an observation has been made that is abnormal and its 
cause is not known then a decision of class "diagnosis" 
is required in the context. Specific classes of decision 
inherit the generic attributes, but are distinguished 
from it by the values that instantiate the attribute tem­
plates, as in: 
relevant_theories( diagnosis, symptomatology). 
relevant_argument_types( diagnosis,causali ty). 
option_proposal_criteria(diagnosis,possibility) ... 
4. The agent must be able to initiate the decision in the 
context; this will entail inheriting all the class informa­
tion to the decision instance, further instantiating it 
with details of the context (e.g. a patient's name) and 
presumably executing some control actions. 
5. Guiding the decision process. Explicit knowledge of 
relevant theories and arguments associated with the 
decision class can be used to guide information acqui­
sition and data interpretation. Decision options (e.g. 
diagnoses) can be proposed on the basis of criteria as­
sociated with the class (in the above example any op­
tion is proposed as a candidate if it satisfies the 
condition for being "possible" (section 2). 
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Reasoning about decisions, beliefs and control environment 
t 
Symbolic Decision Procedure 
Deductive database of decision knowledge. 
(Task theories) 
Deductive database of application knowledge. 
(Domain theories) 
Figure 2: Outline architecture for autonomous decision agents. 
6. The decision should be terminated when appropriate. 
Explicit criteria for formulating decisions also pre­
sumably imply criteria for knowing when those deci­
sions can be taken. For example, the criterion given 
above for requiring a diagnosis decision was that we 
cannot confirm the cause of an abnormal observation. 
The opposite is also true; if we can confirm the cause 
then the diagnosis can be made. 
Work is in progress to provide an adequate theoretical basis 
for these capabilities, and to demonstrate their application. 
Figure 2 presents a schematic outline of a proposed layered 
architecture for autonomous decision agents. The ascend­
ing layers represent knowledge at increasing levels of ab­
straction; each layer is capable of manipulating the 
know ledge in the layers beneath it. 
The three lower layers are deductive data bases represent­
ing (in ascending order) domain theories (application spe­
cific knowledge), task theories (knowledge about 
decisions), and the symbolic decision procedure itself. The 
top layer in figure 2 may be described as a control layer; 
among its functions are to look after interactions with the 
environment, respond to events, initiate, control and termi­
nate decisions and arguments, and maintain the agent's be­
liefs and goals. This organisation echoes the traditional 
distinction between knowledge and action; the symbolic 
decision procedure and other deductive components can be 
naturally implemented with a pure logic theorem prover, 
while the top layer - which operates in time, entails side-ef­
fects on the system's knowledge, and has other non-logical 
features - is procedural in character. 
A full explanation of these examples would need a detailed 
description of an interpreter, which cannot be presented 
here. Some discussion of techniques to provide this capa­
bility can be found in [27]. 
4 PRINCIPLE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
It is imJX>rtant to carry out work like this in the context of 
applications. The OSM and BOSS systems, under develop­
ment in this laboratory, have been important in forcing us 
to develop our approaches and in evaluating our ideas. For 
generality we would like to see applications in domains 
other than medicine and for decision tasks other than med­
ical decisions. We also hope to build on our approach to 
look into compound decisions, such as planning, design 
and other tasks. These tasks can be viewed (in part) as com­
plexes of simple selection decisions. Some experimental 
work on integrating decisions in problem solving is in 
progress, focusing on planning of cancer treatment and for­
mulation of antibiotic therapy for chest infections [19]. 
We are in the early stages of formalising argumentation and 
other aspects of symbolic decision making, focusing on 
non-autonomous decision support systems. Some work on 
autonomous systems is in progress, and influences the 
work, but for the moment is of lower priority. 
Perhaps one of the most obvious features of our proposals 
is the importance we attach to meta-level reasoning, or re­
flection. To express the questions in section 3 and imple­
ment the mechanisms required in section 3.1 it seems clear 
that considerable capabilities for reflection are needed - re­
flecting on beliefs, arguments, knowledge, and decisions. 
Classical decision procedures offer few handholds for de­
veloping these ideas. Formalising the concept of reflection 
will be, we believe, fundamental to significant progress in 
the field. It is perhaps the most difficult yet most fascinat­
ing theoretical challenge before us. 
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